The confirmation code is only displayed and is never compared with anything, so it cannot show that the person confirming is the one who started the login. The confirm form carries a CSRF token and the page cannot be framed, so the attacker has to persuade the user to open the link and click the button themselves.
This issue affects nerves_hub: from 2.5.0 before 2.5.3.
Analysis and contextual insights are available on OpenCVE Cloud.
Vendor Solution
Upgrading does not revoke tokens already handed out. A token from a CLI login is an ordinary API token with a note the client chose, so one an attacker obtained looks like any other. After upgrading, users should review their API tokens on the account page and delete any they do not recognise.
Vendor Workaround
Block POST /api/auth/cli_session at the reverse proxy until the upgrade. It is the only entry point that creates a CLI login, so no link can be produced while it is blocked. CLIs can still sign in with an email and password (nh user auth, POST /api/users/auth), or use an API token created on the account page.
Tracking
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Tue, 10 Nov 2026 11:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Session Fixation vulnerability in the CLI login flow in nerves-hub nerves_hub_web allows an unauthenticated attacker to obtain an API token for another user's account via a crafted login link. Starting a CLI login with POST /api/auth/cli_session needs no authentication and returns a polling token, a confirmation URL that carries that token, and a confirmation code. When a signed-in user opens that URL and clicks Confirm, NervesHub.Accounts.verify_cli_session_token/2 creates an API token for the user's account and stores it on the login, and the next poll of GET /api/auth/cli_session/<token> returns it to whoever started the login. The confirmation code is only displayed and is never compared with anything, so it cannot show that the person confirming is the one who started the login. The confirm form carries a CSRF token and the page cannot be framed, so the attacker has to persuade the user to open the link and click the button themselves. This issue affects nerves_hub: from 2.5.0 before 2.5.3. | |
| Title | Session fixation in the CLI login flow allows an unauthenticated attacker to obtain a user's API token | |
| First Time appeared |
Nerves-hub
Nerves-hub nerves Hub Web |
|
| Weaknesses | CWE-384 | |
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:a:nerves-hub:nerves_hub_web:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Nerves-hub
Nerves-hub nerves Hub Web |
|
| References |
|
|
| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: EEF
Published:
Updated: 2026-11-10T17:11:05.623Z
Reserved: 2026-11-07T21:44:37.269Z
Link: CVE-2026-119446
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-11-10T11:16:40.290
Modified: 2026-11-10T17:17:23.017
Link: CVE-2026-119446
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.