| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: avoid WARN in set_bitrate_mask when sdata not in driver
ieee80211_set_bitrate_mask() checks if the interface is running via
ieee80211_sdata_running(), but it does not check if the interface is
still present in the driver.
When sdata is running but IEEE80211_SDATA_IN_DRIVER is not set, the
call reaches drv_set_bitrate_mask() in driver-ops.h which hits
wlan1: Failed check-sdata-in-driver check, flags: 0x0
WARNING: net/mac80211/driver-ops.h:884 at drv_set_bitrate_mask
Syzkaller triggers this via wext SIOCSIWRATE ioctl. The Call Trace shows
wext_ioctl_dispatch() in wext-core.c dispatching the ioctl, calling
ioctl_standard_call() for SIOCSIWRATE, which calls cfg80211_wext_siwrate()
in wext-compat.c. That builds a bitrate mask and calls
rdev_set_bitrate_mask() which ends up in ieee80211_set_bitrate_mask() in
cfg.c. The interface is marked running via SDATA_STATE_RUNNING but
flags is 0, so check_sdata_in_driver() fails.
When the interface is being torn down, or when wext ioctl is issued
during interface bringup before drv_add_interface() sets IN_DRIVER, the
running check passes while IN_DRIVER is clear.
Check IEEE80211_SDATA_IN_DRIVER in ieee80211_set_bitrate_mask() before
calling the driver, returning -ENETDOWN. This avoids the WARN_ONCE in
driver-ops.h and matches other cfg.c operations that bail early when not
in driver.
This change should be safe because wiphy mutex is held in
cfg80211_wext_siwrate() via guard(wiphy), and IN_DRIVER is set/cleared
under RTNL and wiphy paths in drv_add_interface() and
drv_remove_interface() in driver-ops.c, so the check is race-free
against driver add/remove. Returning -ENETDOWN is the same error other
not-running paths use and does not introduce new locking.
[also add second syzbot report] |
| A Reachable Assertion vulnerability in the rpd process of Juniper Networks Junos OS and Junos OS Evolved allows an authenticated network-based attacker to cause a denial of service via BGP-LS routing updates. |
| A Reachable Assertion vulnerability in the routing protocol daemon (rpd) of Juniper Networks Junos OS and Junos OS Evolved allows an attacker with access to a configured BGP-LS peer to cause an rpd crash via a crafted BGP-LS Link NLRI advertisements. |
| A Reachable Assertion vulnerability in fwstatsd of Juniper Networks Junos OS Evolved allows an authenticated network attacker to cause a denial of service via an SNMP firewall-counter MIB query when at least one firewall counter is configured. |
| A Reachable Assertion vulnerability in the l2ald daemon of Juniper Networks Junos OS and Junos OS Evolved allows an attacker with access to a configured ICCP peer to cause a denial of service via a malformed MC-LAG message. |
| A Reachable Assertion vulnerability in the l2ald process of Juniper Networks Junos OS and Junos OS Evolved allows an adjacent attacker to cause a denial of service via an ICCP peer message when MC-LAG IRB MAC synchronization is enabled. |
| A Reachable Assertion vulnerability in the routing protocol daemon (rpd) of Juniper Networks Junos OS and Junos OS Evolved allows an adjacent OSPF peer to cause a denial of service via OSPF traffic processed while OSPF Source Packet Routing best-route Prefix-SID installation is configured. |
| A Reachable Assertion vulnerability in the routing protocol daemon (rpd) of Juniper Networks Junos OS and Junos OS Evolved allows a compromised LDP neighbor to cause an rpd crash via a crafted LDP message. |
| A Reachable Assertion vulnerability in the routing protocol daemon (rpd) of Juniper Networks Junos OS and Junos OS Evolved allows a network-adjacent BGP peer to cause a denial of service when labeled-unicast aggregate-label is configured. |
| A Reachable Assertion vulnerability in the routing protocol daemon (rpd) of Juniper Networks Junos OS and Junos OS Evolved allows an adjacent eBGP peer to cause a denial of service via a VPLS signaling update when automatic site-ID negotiation is enabled. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: validate GEM_CREATE domain combinations
AMDGPU_GEM_CREATE checked domain bits against AMDGPU_GEM_DOMAIN_MASK,
but did not validate domain combinations. Userspace could combine
CPU|GTT|VRAM with DOORBELL, GDS, GWS, or OA, making
amdgpu_bo_placement_from_domain() exceed AMDGPU_BO_MAX_PLACEMENTS and
hit BUG_ON().
Allow combinations only within CPU/GTT/VRAM, and require non-CPU/GTT/
VRAM domains to be specified one at a time. Return -EINVAL for invalid
combinations in amdgpu_gem_create_ioctl().
v2: Rename helper from amdgpu_gem_domain_valid() to
amdgpu_gem_are_domains_valid() (Christian)
(cherry picked from commit db39852d0c39843cb02048dfb47e4b8c703e9080) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: sch_cake: drop WARN_ON(1) for malformed packets in ACK filter
The sch_cake ACK filter parses packets to find the TCP header and filter
duplicated ACKs if the flow is backlogged. The parsing code contains a
WARN_ON(1) which can be triggered by a malformed IP header in certain
cases. Depending on the system configuration, this leads either to
either spamming dmesg with warnings, or a panic if panic_on_warn is set.
The code already correctly skips the offending packet in the branch that
triggers the warning, so the WARN_ON itself doesn't really serve any
purpose. So just drop it altogether to avoid the inconvenient side
effects. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: Ignore pending PV EOI if the vCPU has since disabled PV EOIs
Ignore KVM's internal "service pending PV EOI" request if the vCPU has
disabled PV EOIs since the request was made. Asserting that PV EOIs are
enabled can fail if reading guest memory in pv_eoi_get_user() fails, i.e.
if pv_eoi_test_and_clr_pending() bails early, *and* the vCPU also disables
PV EOIs.
kernel BUG at arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c:3338!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
CPU: 4 UID: 1000 PID: 890 Comm: pv_eoi_test Not tainted 7.0.0-d585aa5894d8-vm #337 PREEMPT
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic+0x12b/0x140 [kvm]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x1075/0x1c30 [kvm]
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2d5/0x980 [kvm]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x8a/0xd0
do_syscall_64+0xb5/0xb40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
</TASK>
Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: nv: Drop bogus WARN for write to ZCR_EL2
It is entirely possible for a guest to write to the ZCR_EL2 sysreg alias
while in a nested context, as it is expected if FEAT_NV2 is advertised
to the L1 hypervisor.
Get rid of the bogus WARN which, since the hyp vectors were installed at
this point, has the effect of a hyp_panic... |
| The Link Layer Control Procedure (LLCP) implementation of the Zephyr software Bluetooth LE Controller retains the receive node that carried an accepted LL_PHY_UPDATE_IND so that it can later be reused for the host notification when the update instant is reached (llcp_rx_node_retain() in subsys/bluetooth/controller/ll_sw/ull_llcp.c, and the node is deliberately not recycled while marked NODE_RX_TYPE_RETAIN). The invalid-PDU arms of llcp_lp_pu_rx() and llcp_rp_pu_rx() in subsys/bluetooth/controller/ll_sw/ull_llcp_phy.c completed the procedure via llcp_lr_complete() / llcp_rr_complete() without first releasing that retained node, so the procedure context — the only remaining reference to the node — was freed while the node was still held out of the receive pool.
A peer device on an established LE connection can drive this deterministically and without pairing or encryption. Against a peripheral it sends LL_PHY_REQ, receives LL_PHY_RSP, sends a valid LL_PHY_UPDATE_IND with an instant a few connection events in the future (so the node becomes retained), and then, before the instant is reached, sends any other LL Control PDU such as LL_LENGTH_REQ; ull_cp_rx() routes it to the active remote PHY Update procedure, which takes the invalid-PDU path. The mirror case applies to a locally initiated PHY Update followed by an LL_REJECT_IND.
In the default configuration (CONFIG_BT_ASSERT and CONFIG_BT_CTLR_ASSERT_DEBUG both default y) the violated invariant in llcp_lr_check_done() / llcp_rr_check_done() triggers a controller assertion, ending in k_oops() (or k_panic()) — a single crafted PDU sequence from radio range faults the device. With those assertions compiled out, each attempt silently leaks one receive PDU node and its memq link; because the controller receive pool is small (PDU_RX_CNT, driven by CONFIG_BT_CTLR_RX_BUFFERS, which defaults to 1) and each attempt costs the attacker only a reconnect, a few repetitions exhaust the pool and leave Bluetooth inoperable until reboot. On releases v3.4.0 through v3.7.x the assertion is never reached, whatever the configuration, so every attempt leaks silently.
The impact is limited to availability: the orphaned node leaves no dangling pointer that is later dereferenced and is never delivered to the host, so there is no memory corruption or information disclosure. The same pull request applies the identical release to the Connection Update and CIS-create procedures, whose invalid-PDU arms had the same omission. |
| FreeRDP before 3.32.0 contains a NULL pointer dereference vulnerability in the websocket transport that allows a malicious gateway to crash clients by sending zero-length pings. When the payload length is zero, websocket_reply_pong passes a nullptr stream to websocket_reply_close, triggering an assertion failure that terminates the client process and causes denial of service. |
| The Bluetooth Link Layer control procedure code in subsys/bluetooth/controller/ll_sw/ull_llcp_conn_upd.c retains the received RX node while a Connection Update / Connection Parameter procedure waits for its instant, so the node can later carry the host notification (llcp_rx_node_retain(), which marks it NODE_RX_TYPE_RETAIN and thereby suppresses the normal recycling in ull.c). The default: arm of llcp_rp_cu_rx() and llcp_lp_cu_rx() — the "invalid PDU, terminate the connection" path — completed the procedure without releasing that retained node. llcp_rr_check_done() then dequeued and freed the procedure context with ctx->node_ref.rx still pointing at the retained node, dropping the last reference to it.
A peer device in radio range can reach this without pairing, bonding, or encryption. Against a peripheral, the peer sends a well-formed LL_CONNECTION_UPDATE_IND with an instant a few connection events in the future (the node is retained and the procedure enters RP_CU_STATE_WAIT_INSTANT), then, before the instant is reached, sends any other LL Control PDU such as LL_LENGTH_REQ. ull_cp_rx() routes that PDU into the active remote Connection Update procedure, which takes the invalid-PDU path. The central role is reachable symmetrically after accepting an LL_CONNECTION_PARAM_REQ, and the local-procedure variant is reachable with LL_REJECT_IND.
With CONFIG_BT_CTLR_ASSERT_DEBUG enabled (its default), the resulting state violates the invariant asserted in llcp_rr_check_done(), so the two-PDU sequence produces an immediate fatal error in the controller. With those asserts disabled, each occurrence permanently loses one node from the controller's small fixed RX pool (sized from CONFIG_BT_CTLR_RX_BUFFERS, which defaults to 1); repeating the sequence across reconnections exhausts the pool, after which the link-layer receive path operates on a NULL node. The impact is an unauthenticated, remotely triggerable denial of service persisting until reboot; there is no memory-disclosure or memory-corruption consequence, since the leaked node simply becomes unreachable. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: don't warn when an IBSS has no channel to scan
ieee80211_request_ibss_scan() warns when regulatory leaves no
allowed channel, but that can happen as the regdomain can change
while IBSS is operating, and it can continue to operate briefly
during the 60s grace period until it's shut down.
Just remove the warning in this case. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: skip gfx switch_power_profile during GPU reset
During resume from GPU reset, the gfx idle work may invoke switch_power_profile
before the reset completes. This causes the following assert error because the
register access occurs without first releasing the GPU reset semaphore:
[ 1576.768935] CR2: 0000559ea133ead0 CR3: 00000002e6c42000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
[ 1576.768940] Call Trace:
[ 1576.768944] <TASK>
[ 1576.768953] amdgpu_device_rreg+0x21/0x50 [amdgpu]
[ 1576.769158] smu_msg_v1_send_msg+0x1a4/0x6e0 [amdgpu]
[ 1576.769437] smu_cmn_send_smc_msg_with_params_ext+0xba/0x120 [amdgpu]
[ 1576.769721] smu_cmn_send_smc_msg_with_param+0x33/0x40 [amdgpu]
[ 1576.769993] smu_v13_0_0_set_power_profile_mode+0x192/0x2b0 [amdgpu]
[ 1576.770267] smu_bump_power_profile_mode+0x5d/0x80 [amdgpu]
[ 1576.770538] smu_switch_power_profile+0xa4/0xf0 [amdgpu]
[ 1576.770839] amdgpu_dpm_switch_power_profile+0x6f/0x90 [amdgpu]
[ 1576.771210] amdgpu_gfx_profile_idle_work_handler+0xe9/0x130 [amdgpu]
[ 1576.771460] process_one_work+0x23e/0x6f0
[ 1576.771491] worker_thread+0x1c4/0x380
[ 1576.771506] kthread+0x10c/0x150
[ 1576.771512] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 1576.771518] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 1576.771530] ret_from_fork+0x314/0x390
[ 1576.771537] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 1576.771546] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
(cherry picked from commit d93b1ff538ce9750c01e0dd0aa62575579c0fc08) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe: Guard page-fault worker with runtime PM check
During VM teardown, the VM's runtime PM reference is dropped
asynchronously, allowing the device to autosuspend while stale page
faults belonging to the now-dead VM are still queued. When the
page-fault worker later tries to ack one of these, it calls into
guc_ct_send_locked() on an already-suspended device, tripping:
Assertion `!xe_pm_runtime_suspended(xe)` failed!
WARNING at xe_device.c:1267 xe_device_assert_mem_access+0x11c/0x140 [xe]
A live VM/exec queue always holds a PM reference while it has
outstanding work, so if the device is suspended at ack time, the
owning context is already gone and the fault is stale.
Take a runtime PM reference across the entire pagefault
queue worker to safely deliver acks for torn-down VMs.
v3:
- Move PM ref to the generic xe_pagefault_queue_work using
guard(xe_pm_runtime)(xe) instead of tracking it in the GuC
backend(Matt Brost).
v2:
- Hold PM ref across the entire batch (begin/end) instead of per-ack.
This prevents the device from autosuspending mid-batch, which would
leave write_only acks written but the end flush skipped, and skip
counter++, desyncing the cadence check.(Himal)
- Add a comment explaining stale faults.(Himal)
(cherry picked from commit fcc2431d2213dc4d04250c4f1ae87d9c3ae0d455)
[Rodrigo: Added xe_device struct for compatibility while cherry-picking] |
